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APPEAL FROM THE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
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and POLLAK,* District Judge. 
 
(Filed February 9, 1998) 
 
       Pam E. Goldman (ARGUED) 
       Post Office Box 81042 
       Pittsburgh, PA 15217 
 
Attorney for Appellant 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Honorable Louis H. Pollak, Senior United States District Judge for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
  
       Jerome T. Foerster (ARGUED) 
       Office of Attorney General of 
        Pennsylvania 
       Strawberry Square 
       15th Floor 
       Harrisburg, PA 17120 
 
        Attorney for Appellees 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
LEWIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
Gary Lee Hess appeals from the district court's denial of 
his habeas corpus petition, raising two related claims. First, 
he alleges that trial counsel's performance was deficient 
due to a decision not to call certain witnesses. Second, 
Hess contends that his lawyer labored under a conflict of 
interest caused by his simultaneous representation of the 
victims' father in another case, and that this conflict 
impermissibly tainted counsel's performance during Hess's 
trial. We conclude that Hess's attorney did not violate 
professional standards by not calling additional witnesses 
at trial. Because the record does not reveal whether Hess 
preserved his conflict of interest claim, however, we will 
remand the remainder of the case to the district court for 
consideration of whether this claim has been exhausted. 
 
I. 
 
Hess was convicted of multiple counts of sexual 
misconduct with the minor children of his sister, Barbara 
Becker. Hess's brother-in-law, Thomas Becker ("Becker"), is 
the father of two of the victims. When Hess's case went to 
trial, his attorney, Mr. Ling, also represented Becker on 
unrelated drug charges. Hess asserts that due to a conflict 
of interest, Ling failed to interview potential witnesses who 
would have stated that Becker, not Hess, actually abused 
the victims. In particular, Hess alleges that Thomas Hafer, 
Becker's cousin, would have testified that Becker gave the 
children drugs and then sexually molested them. Hess also 
contends that Ling declined to investigate a supposed 
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deathbed statement by the children's mother, which 
inculpated her husband and suggested that he might have 
framed Hess.1 
 
Hess maintains that he asked Ling to call Becker and 
Hafer as witnesses. Ling declined to do so, and also did not 
investigate the possibility that Becker committed the acts of 
sexual abuse. In addition, Ling did not follow up on Hess's 
request that he interview co-workers who might support an 
alibi defense. As a result, Hess's defense consisted almost 
entirely of testimony from Hess himself and from his closest 
relatives. 
 
II. 
 
We address first the claim that Ling's representation fell 
below objective standards of reasonableness because he did 
not present the testimony of certain witnesses of whom he 
was aware. "Because ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims present mixed questions of law and fact . . . review 
is plenary." United States v. Kauffman, 109 F.3d 186, 187 
(3d Cir. 1997). A defendant who alleges that counsel was 
ineffective due to strategic errors must show both that the 
attorney's performance was lacking, and that this deficient 
performance resulted in prejudice. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
 
A. 
 
The potential witnesses whom Hess argues Ling should 
have interviewed and called fall roughly into two categories: 
alibi witnesses and witnesses who would have testified that 
someone other than Hess committed the abuse. Addressing 
the latter category first, we conclude that Ling was not 
ineffective because he failed to call witnesses who would 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Apparently, the day before Barbara Becker died, a Children and Youth 
Services ("CYS") employee visited her at the hospital to discuss the 
accusations that Hess had abused the children. Hess alleges that 
Barbara Becker vehemently defended his innocence in the presence of 
the CYS worker and hospital personnel, and that she stated that Thomas 
Becker wished to implicate Hess. Hess maintains that Ling should have 
called the hospital personnel as disinterested witnesses. 
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have testified that either Thomas Becker or one of the 
children's babysitters sexually abused the victims. Our 
review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims does not 
permit us, with the benefit of hindsight, to engage in 
speculation about how the case might best have been tried. 
We therefore accord counsel's strategic trial decisions great 
deference. Because Ling's trial strategy allegedly resulted 
from incomplete investigation, however, his decisions are 
entitled to a lesser degree of deference. United States v. 
Kauffman, 109 F.3d 186, 190 (3d Cir. 1997). ("While 
counsel is entitled to substantial deference with respect to 
strategic judgment, an attorney must investigate a case, 
when he has cause to do so, in order to provide minimally 
competent professional representation.") More specifically, 
 
       strategic choices made after less than complete 
       investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that 
       reasonable professional judgments support the 
       limitations on investigation [and] counsel has a duty to 
       make reasonable investigations or to make a 
       reasonable decision that makes particular 
       investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, 
       a particular decision not to investigate must be directly 
       assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, 
       applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's 
       judgments. 
 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d 
1425, 1432 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984)). 
 
Considering all the circumstances, Ling made 
"reasonable decision[s] that ma[de] particular investigations 
unnecessary." Id. Ling stated at the state post-conviction 
hearing that Becker would have been a hostile witness, and 
it is undisputed that Becker disliked Hess and wanted to 
see him convicted. We therefore agree with the district 
court's conclusion that Ling reasonably decided not to call 
Becker at trial. Further, Ling also testified that he rejected 
Hafer and other of the children's babysitters as witnesses 
only after concluding that the jury would find them 
unpersuasive because of their unsavory appearances or 
criminal records. Hess believes that the witnesses' 
questionable backgrounds actually could have helped his 
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case, because the jury might have inferred that these 
witnesses abused the children themselves. Hess overlooks 
the risks inherent in this strategy, however, since the 
witnesses were unlikely to cooperate with such a defense. 
Accordingly, we disagree that Ling's decision not to call 
these witnesses violated objective professional norms. 
Finally, Ling did not investigate Barbara Becker's alleged 
deathbed statement, which purported to exonerate Hess, 
because he believed it was not helpful, and would not have 
been admissible at trial.2 We emphasize that our holding 
regarding these witnesses addresses only the issue of 
whether these actions necessarily violated objective 
standards of reasonableness, irrespective of any conflict of 
interest. Because, as described in Part III, a different legal 
analysis governs whether an actual conflict of interest 
adversely affects legal representation, this holding does not 
influence our review of Hess's conflict of interest claim. 
 
We also hold that Ling was not ineffective for failing to 
call Gary Trivelpiece, a Pennsylvania State Police trooper, to 
testify regarding alleged inconsistencies in the victims' 
accounts. This, too, was a reasonable trial strategy, 
because Ling feared that Trivelpiece's testimony would alert 
the jury to additional charges pending against Hess in Blair 
County, Pennsylvania. Ling reasonably could have believed 
that the prejudicial effect of this information outweighed 
any benefit to be gained from Trivelpiece's testimony. We 
will not find counsel ineffective for adopting a litigation 
strategy based upon this reasonable professional judgment. 
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. 
 
B. 
 
Furthermore, we reject Hess's claim that he is entitled to 
a retrial because counsel failed to call additional alibi 
witnesses. Even assuming that prevailing professional 
norms required Ling to present additional alibi testimony, 
Hess suffered no prejudice from this potential misstep. To 
show prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, Court of Common Pleas of 
Bedford County, Pennsylvania, August 10, 1992, at 52. 
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trial's outcome would have been different. See id. at 694; 
see also Frey v. Fulcomer, 974 F.2d 348, 358 (3d Cir. 
1992). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 
to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694. 
 
Hess suffered no prejudice from Ling's failure to call 
additional alibi witnesses because even without these 
witnesses, Ling presented a plausible, if ultimately 
unsuccessful, alibi defense through Hess, his wife and his 
mother, all of whom testified that Hess was never alone 
with the children. We do not dismiss lightly Hess's 
argument that "alibi testimony by a defendant's family 
members is of significantly less exculpatory value than the 
testimony of an objective witness." Romero v. Tansy, 46 
F.3d 1024, 1030 (10th Cir. 1995). Nonetheless, in this case, 
because the crime occurred in the house where Hess lived, 
and the crucial issue was whether Hess spent time alone 
with the victims, it is unlikely that outside witnesses could 
have provided much relevant information. Moreover, Hess's 
argument assumes that the abuse only occurred during the 
brief period when he worked in another county and did not 
sleep in the Becker household on week nights. This is 
incorrect. The children testified to instances of abuse 
outside that time frame, and in any case, even when Hess 
worked out of town, he stayed at the Beckers' house on 
weekends. In fact, to present a complete alibi defense, Ling 
would have had to account for Hess's whereabouts during 
the course of over a year, something Hess himself admits 
was virtually impossible. Further, since Hess did not show 
that his proposed witnesses would have testified in his 
favor, we cannot conclude that they would have convinced 
the jury of his innocence. Accordingly, we hold that Ling's 
failure to interview and call at trial every alibi witness Hess 
recommended does not undermine our confidence in the 
verdict. 
 
III. 
 
Hess also asks us to grant a retrial on the grounds that 
Ling labored under an actual conflict of interest, which 
prevented a meaningful defense. We are not free to decide 
this question, because the record does not show whether 
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Hess raised this claim in previous appeals. See Landano v. 
Rafferty, 897 F.2d 661, 668 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that a 
state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies before 
a federal court can consider his petition for habeas corpus). 
Neither the state courts' opinions nor the magistrate judge's 
reports and recommendations addressed this argument. It 
is clear, however, that Hess presented this claim to the 
district court, which considered only whether Ling was 
ineffective for failing to call Thomas Becker as a defense 
witness, and not whether an actual conflict of interest 
influenced Ling's decision not to investigate Becker's 
possible guilt. Accordingly, we deem it appropriate to 
remand this matter to the district court. Cf. Lace v. United 
States, 736 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1984) (remanding due to 
possible conflict of interest where defendant pleaded guilty 
on advice of counsel who also represented a potential 
witness for the prosecution). 
 
On remand, the district court should first consider 
whether Hess's conflict of interest claim was "fairly 
presented" to the state courts, i.e., whether Hess presented 
a claim to the state courts which was based on the same 
facts and legal theory argued in his habeas petition. 
Landano, 897 F.3d at 668-69. If, however, that claim has 
been preserved, Hess's argument raises grave doubts about 
the reliability of the verdict. 
 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant 
counsel's "undivided loyalty free of conflict of interest." 
Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125 (3d Cir. 
1984). This requirement is an essential foundation of our 
adversarial system of justice, providing the minimum 
necessary to ensure that criminal defendants receive 
representation that "puts the government to its proofs in an 
adversarial manner." United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 
742, 748 (3d Cir. 1991). When an attorney's representation 
is corrupted by conflicting interests, he or she "breaches 
the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most basic of counsel's 
duties." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. In such circumstances, 
the precise impact on the defense is so difficult to measure, 
and the possibility of prejudice so great, that we scrutinize 
the facts differently than in other ineffective assistance of 
counsel cases. Id. 
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Specifically, counsel is ineffective if he or she "actively 
represented conflicting interests" and an actual conflict of 
interest adversely affected the lawyer's performance, Cuyler 
v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980). Unlike the case in 
which a defendant argues only that counsel pursuedflawed 
trial strategies, if the accused shows that an actual conflict 
of interest tainted counsel's performance, we will presume 
prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; United States v. 
Gambino, 864 F.2d 1064, 1070 (3d Cir. 1988) ("To reach 
the level of constitutional ineffectiveness the conflict must 
cause some lapse in representation contrary to the 
defendant's interests but such lapse need not rise to the 
level of actual prejudice.") (citation omitted). If the accused 
can establish only a potential conflict of interest, prejudice 
must be proved. See Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1054, 
1057 n.3 (8th Cir. 1996); Stoia v. United States, 22 F.3d 
766, 770 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 
If the district court reaches this claim on remand, Hess 
may show that an actual conflict of interest arose from 
Ling's dual representation if his "interests diverge[d] with 
respect to a material factual or legal issue or to a course of 
action such that the attorney finds himself in the untenable 
position of serving two clients with incompatible needs." 
United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1140 (3d Cir. 
1990) (citations omitted). To do so, Hess must identify a 
plausible defense strategy that could have been pursued, 
and show that this alternative strategy inherently conflicted 
with, or was rejected due to, Ling's other loyalties or 
interests. See Gambino, 864 F.2d at 1070. Significantly, he 
need not show that the lapse in representation was so 
egregious as to violate objective standards for attorney 
performance. See id. (noting that accused may establish a 
lapse in representation merely by showing counsel rejected 
a defense that "possessed sufficient substance to be a 
viable alternative"). In focusing upon evidence that Becker 
molested the children, it would appear that Hess has 
identified a plausible defense which could have been 
pursued. But Hess also argues that his interests and 
Becker's conflicted, since implicating Becker in the crimes 
might have exculpated Hess, but could have resulted in 
charges being brought against Becker. See Freund v. 
Butterworth, 117 F.3d 1513 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding 
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that actual conflict of interest adversely affected law firm's 
representation when firm rejected viable defense strategy of 
shifting blame for murder to its former client); see also 
Moscony, 910 F.2d at 749 (holding that a conflict of interest 
exists where a potential defense would implicate an 
attorney's other clients in crimes for which they might later 
be indicted). In addition, if witnesses testified that Thomas 
Becker molested the children after giving them drugs, that 
testimony might have been admissible, subject to the rules 
of evidence, in Becker's trial for drug offenses in which Ling 
was defense counsel. Furthermore, inculpating Becker in 
sexual misconduct almost certainly would have 
undermined Becker's trust in Ling, making Ling's 
representation of Becker more difficult. 
 
Moreover, we note that our decision in United States v. 
Gambino, supra, does not foreclose a conclusion that Ling's 
performance suffered due to an actual conflict of interest. 
In Gambino, a defense attorney failed to present evidence 
suggesting that the defendant Gambino had been charged 
with possessing heroin that actually belonged to another of 
counsel's clients, Mazzara. This dual representation 
produced no actual conflict of interest, however, because 
the government already possessed the evidence implicating 
Mazzara in illegal drug activity. Thus the attorney never 
had to choose between presenting evidence helpful to 
Gambino's defense and possibly prejudicing Mazzara. 
Gambino, 864 F.2d at 1071. By contrast, nothing indicates 
that the police suspected Thomas Becker of child 
molestation. Furthermore, in Gambino, trial counsel did not 
suggest Mazzara was the source of the heroin because he 
believed this argument was so implausible that it would 
undermine the entire defense. Id. at 1071-72. Unlike 
Gambino's attorney, Ling has not testified that implicating 
Becker would be a specious defense; Ling merely stated 
that he did not call Becker as a witness because Becker 
disliked Hess. Even assuming Ling had legitimate reasons 
for not calling Becker to testify, that fact cannot explain his 
decision not to consider other witnesses, notably Thomas 
Hafer, who could have testified that Becker abused the 
victims. 
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IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's 
denial of the writ of habeas corpus, insofar as it applies to 
Hess's claim that his representation fell below professional 
standards because counsel failed to call additional 
witnesses. The district court, however, did not explore fully 
Hess's claim that his lawyer rejected a defense inculpating 
another client due to an actual conflict of interest, which, 
in turn, may have deprived him of the right to counsel. 
Accordingly, the district court's order of June 5, 1996, is 
vacated in part, and this matter is remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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